Piotr Bein's blog = blog Piotra Beina

07/04/2011

Join a grassroots investigation of 3/11 nuclear catastrophe – Stuxnet in Fukushima-Daiichi?

Filed under: Uncategorized — grypa666 @ 10:07

Join a grassroots investigation of 3/11 nuclear catastrophe – Stuxnet in Fukushima-Daiichi?

Andrzej Szubert 7.4.2011, edited in Polish for translations, and translated into English by Piotr Bein, independent genocide researcher

The media have publicized the quake and resulting tsunami’s force in Daiichi as well as TEPCO’s alleged criminal laxes in periodic inspections of the nuclear power station (NPS) – apparently to rub in an alleged failure of the plant’s cooling system. Regardless, the system’s power generators would be maintained and checked meticulously by the employees. It is the “ordinary” Japanese, who remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki anniversaries, aware of the power of the atom.

According to TEPCO (11.3.2011), two young employees have died in turbine no. 2 building underground (allegedly during the quake), while on a regular inspection. There is no proof of any direct damage in the NPS from the quake.

A Vision

The Quake starts at about 14:46, the reactors shut down automatically,  and after the alleged breakage in the power grid feeding Daiichi, emergency power generators kick in. NPS’s several hundred employees have until about 15:41, when the announced tsunami would hit the NPS piers. The crew takes to securing watertightness of generator rooms or such, for it is the generators that the safety of the NPS now depends on. A few scores of men per generator have about half an hour to run additional checks and tighten up against looming water intrusion. They know spent fuel pool (SFP) no. 4 is the most critical, for it holds the reactor fuel laid away for the duration of reactor inspection, as well as previous batch of spent rods – a total of over 1300 fuel rod assemblies containing about  2.5 million nuclear fuel rods. The other SFPs each hold about 1 million rods, all spent.

The imperative of SFP 4 priority surfaced in the media only after Unit 4 explosion. Did TEPCO and media science editors try to hide something? Why did media reports on Unit 4 explosion show pictures from the previous explosions of other units, but not of Unit 4? Why wasn’t the exact time of Unit 4 explosion reported? All the other major events at Daiichi are reported to the minute. In German Wikipedia: Über den genauen Zeitpunkt der Explosion ist nichts bekannt. The exact time of the explosion is unknown.

Stuxnet

From the Polish mainstream paper: A computer virus called Stuxnet has been developed jointly by Israeli and US specialists. It has been tested for 2 years in top secret Israeli nuclear complex Dimona in the Negev desert.

Israel has sabotaged the Iranian nuclear program with Stuxnet:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12465688

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11809827

An Israeli firm was in charge of security at Japanese nuclear facilities prior to 3/11.

Broader Suspicion

If Stuxnet is the direct culprit of 3/11 at Daiichi, the villain would also be suspected of triggering the quake, which in turn would cause the tsunami.

On 11.3.2011, the media reported the quake (8.8 Richter scale) offshore Japan, the tsunami hitting the eastern shores of Honshu, and the failure of cooling at Daiichi NPS shortly after. The quake allegedly damaged the external power supply. All of the emergency power generators failed allegedly due to tsunami, and emergency batteries lasted 8 hours.

The official 3/11 version: following an automatic shutdown of the reactors by the quake, the emergency power generators kick in, but fail about an hour later, damaged by the tsunami.

According to an acquaintance in Texas: According to American TV, tsunami flooded the NPS. The media say the quake has damaged the NPS’s external power supply, while the diesel generators would not start, so for some time the batteries supplied power to the pumps.

Different versions on the generators’ failure:

  • Damaged by tsunami, for the generators’ location on the foreshore.
  • Tsunami took the diesel fuel tanks of the generators, so they had no fuel to work with.
  • Location of generators: low on the piers, higher in the turbine buildings, or at the foot of the reactors.

Doubts

Quake damages the power grid?

The media have increased the 11.3.2011 quake’s force from 8.8 initaially reported to unprecedented 9.0. The force is weaker on land then in the epicentre 130 km offshore, due to damping by the Earth’s crust. On Honshu on 11.3.2011, the force has not exceeded 6.5 – 6.8. Measuruing data, open with password “poliszynel”.

The quake at Daiichi and surrounding area has not damaged the external power lines. This photo shows undamaged masts near Daiichi NPS, after the quake and tsunami, but before the NPS explosions. On a road to the NPS, there are overturned or damaged power line masts, absolutely no earthquake damage. Apart from alleged tsunami damage on Daiichi NPS piers, not one building at the plant or nearby has been damaged.

On this photo taken before the tsunami, see the electric cables at the reactor marked A. White diagonal lines near reactor C are pipelines, perhaps containing cables. One can see no other possible connections to the external power grid. After the explosions, photos 1 and 11 show intact cables connecting to the grid.

Was Daiichi’s power really disabled by the external grid’s damage or a  cyber-attack with something like Stuxnet?

Further doubts

Emergency power generators should have kicked in at the moment of external power failure. The generators failed right away, some reports say, but others say  they started to generate electricity, but stopped all at once after about an hour, allegedly succumbing to tsunami.

Shortly after 11.3.2011, photos appeared on the Internet, of an allegedly huge scale of damage at Daiichi NPS, as if to show it was the tsunami that caused the generators’ failure:

http://fakty.interia.pl/raport/kataklizm-w-japonii/news/rzad-japonii-czarnobyla-2-nie-bedzie-to-znaczy-nie-powinno,1609630

http://www.abc.net.au/news/events/japan-quake-2011/beforeafter.htm

http://web.de/magazine/nachrichten/bildergalerien/bilder/12374704-was-der-tsunami-anrichtete.html – /cid12374704/1

These photos had poor resolution and unnatural coloration, rendering interpretations more difficult. For the first week, TV stations featured Daiichi from one camera angle a few km away. Furious tsunami was shown wiping off many towns, but no wave overwhelming the NPS, although it was filmed allegedly approaching Daiichi. Only after 2 weeks, many stations showed it concurrently (example).

Possibly, a tsunami wave did reach the NPS, but was it able to damage all the generators?

Futile photo-interpretations “after” tsunami

“Before” and “after” photos taken from a similar angle and in similar colour are needed to ascertain that a “before” photo is dated days or weeks, not years, before the tsunami. On older photos, many objects “missing” on the “after” photos may have been dismantled and/or moved before 11/3.

Example: On the bottom photo on the pier’s right, two cylindrical tanks are missing, apparently wiped off by tsunami. They are on the top photo. But on the top photo, to the right of the turbine building, a white tank, visible on the bottom photo, is missing. But here, it does not look like swept from the pier and deposited where it is. Likely, the tanks have been moved some time before the tsunami. One of them went beside the turbine building and was in transit on 11.3.2011 (centered on the road and upright).

In the “funnel” of the access road corridor, there are no traces of tsunami. In other places, as video footage documents, similar topography drove the tsunami up to 40 m elevation. The photo was taken after the tsunami, but before the explosions. Fighting the looming nuclear catastrophe, employees would not bother removing any tsunami mud nor out-of-the-way debris. This photo shows that the tsunami at Daiichi NPS did not have as devastating effect as elsewhere on the coast. Tsunami would destroy the white derrick on the pier (photo 7 upper part). Only the outer breakwater shields the derrick, not the inner one that has not protected the objects on the pier directly in front of the turbine buildings.

Photo 2 provides an example of tsunami bending the turbine building gates (magnify the photo). Why on a later photo (the bottom one) the same gate appears bent in a different way? Both photos date after tsunami. Perhaps, faced with the power outage, the crew rammed the gate to get inside?

Were the generators protected from flooding and how?

A watertight barrier would do. Knowing the tsunamis and typhoons in their region,   Japanese engineers must have designed the generators safe from flooding. Would the batteries be better protected, since they have not failed? The generators are more important than batteries, for they provide a much longer-lasting power to the cooling system. Seawater that has allegedly damaged all generators should have short-circuited the batteries, damaging them.

NPS employees knew sea-salt’s destructivity, corroding all metal on the shore. The emergency generators, so vital to NPS security, would be located in watertight rooms.

Reactor rescue intentionally indolent, to maximize damage and radioactive emissions?

  • Following power supply failure from the external grid and Daiichi emergency generators, it would be sensible to bring mobile generators on site, which are available in Japan. The roads to Daiiczi NPS were not blocked after the tsunami, while military vehicles could go through difficult terrain. Before the explosions, connecting mobile generators to the cooling systems would not be a problem, but this was not done.
  • Why, after the explosions, cooling proceeded with seawater, against experts’ advice? Only after the salt clogged the pipes, vessels with fresh water sailed to Daiichi?
  • Why, after the explosions, the cooling with pouring water did not proceed continuosly, using remotely-controlled robots or such? Instead, “nuclear samurais” were exploited, interrupting the operation repeatedly for extreme radiation. Japan ran out of machines and robots?
  • Why, only a week after the onset of the catastrophe, Japanese authorities asked a German firm to lend an automatic device: a tall, remotely controlled jib (concrete pump, according to Arnie Gundersen) to pour water on the reactors and basins? Japan ran out of such devices?
  • Why only in the 3rd week closeup cameras appeared, while drones and remote photography are common military technology? Has NATO not pledged to expand mandate to all kinds of threats to humanity and democracy?
  • Why the UN and Western powers quickly decide to attack Libya and devoted substantial resources to the campaign, but only symbolic ones to the Daiichi crisis and rescue of radioactivity and tsunami victims?

What is needed

The author doesn’t have the resources necessary to carry on with the investigation. A website is needed with a time-line, source material, a forum for experts (generator technology, electrical engineering, bathymetric analysis of waves, photo-interpretation…), a discussion group for others etc.

Let this text be a start of a global grassroots campaign, similar to seeking the 9/11 truth.

Please translate into major languages, including Japanese, and disseminate. Let’s see the initial work sprout or be dismissed as yet another conspiracy theory.

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2 Comments

  1. […] Join a grassroots investigation of 3/11 nuclear catastrophe – Stuxnet in Fukushima-Daiichi? […]

    Pingback by Jim Stone: Nuclear sabotage at Fukushima | Piotr Bein's blog = blog Piotra Beina — 15/09/2013 @ 03:51

  2. […] Join a grassroots investigation of 3/11 nuclear catastrophe – Stuxnet in Fukushima-Daiichi? […]

    Pingback by SUPER-ALARM: Jim Stone endangered in Mexico for exposing Israel’s role in Fuku | Piotr Bein's blog = blog Piotra Beina — 24/09/2013 @ 19:54


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